

*Expert report of Dr. Matthew Levitt in the matter of**US v Tsarnaev 13-Cr. 10200-GAO*I. Scope of Engagement

I have been asked to provide expert opinion on the following issues and their implications for this case:

- The changing nature of today's terrorist threat;
- Radicalization trends, including online;
- Brief analysis of some of the material found in the possession of the accused.

This report is broken down into five sections:

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II. Qualifications

My qualifications as a noted expert in international terrorism, with a focus on Middle East terrorist groups and particular expertise in their logistical and financial support networks, are based on a multidisciplinary combination of my academic education, professional training and experience.

I am a United States citizen, residing in the Washington, D.C. area. I hold both a Masters of Law and Diplomacy (MALD) and a Ph.D. in International Relations from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. The Fletcher School, a member of the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs and one of the preeminent graduate programs in international affairs in the United States, is renowned for its interdisciplinary curriculum and approach to international studies.

My Masters degree included concentrations in Conflict Resolution, International Security Studies, and the Middle East. My doctoral dissertation entitled "The Impact of Acute Security Crises on the Process of Ongoing Negotiations," examines the impact of terrorism on the Arab-Israeli peace process. The dissertation examines acts of terrorism carried out by both Islamic and Jewish terrorists. I was awarded several fellowships and grants in support of this research, including a graduate research fellowship from the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. While at Harvard I conducted extensive field research in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In a letter supporting my application for funding for my doctoral work, an assistant director of the FBI described the project as one that "will be of great benefit to the FBI and the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC)."

Prior to joining the Washington Institute, I served as a counterterrorism intelligence analyst with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) providing tactical and strategic analysis in support of counterterrorism operations. There I developed a special focus on fundraising and logistical support networks for Middle East terrorist groups. In addition, I participated as a team member in a number of crisis situations, including the terrorist threat surrounding the turn of the millennium and the September 11 attacks. In my official capacity as a U.S. government intelligence analyst, I researched and analyzed trends and patterns of international terrorist groups, produced written products and oral presentations for FBI management, FBI field agents and other agencies, and liaised with U.S. intelligence community counterparts, other U.S. government agencies, and foreign services. I received extensive training and developed particular expertise in the analysis of material collected through investigations and the synthesis and further analysis of this material together with other sources of information provided by other agencies, open source information, and more. In this capacity I also made several trips to the Middle East. Indicative of my expertise, I earned three letters of commendation for my analytical contributions to FBI counterterrorism operations, as well as five awards in recognition of superior service rendered to the FBI.

In November 2001 I joined The Washington Institute for Near East Policy as a Senior Fellow in Terrorism Studies. Founded in 1985, The Washington Institute seeks to “advance a balanced and realistic understanding of American interests in the Middle East” by bringing “scholarship to bear on the making of U.S. policy in this vital region of the world.” The Institute’s Board of Advisors includes several former Secretaries of State, a former Director of Central Intelligence, and other former senior government officials and diplomats. The Washington Institute holds annual conferences and periodic policy forums, hosts blue-ribbon presidential study groups, and publishes scholarly research.

From November 2005 through January 2007 I served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis in the United States Department of the Treasury. In that capacity, I served both as a senior official within the department’s terrorism and financial intelligence branch and as deputy chief of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis, one of sixteen U.S. intelligence agencies coordinated under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. During my tenure at Treasury, I was at the center of the government’s efforts to protect the U.S. financial system from abuse and to deny terrorists, weapons proliferators, and other rogue actors the ability to finance threats to U.S. national security. In recognition of exceptional service to the department, in January 2007 I was awarded the Treasury Department’s “Exceptional Service Award.” In 2008-2009 I also served as an advisor on counterterrorism and intelligence for the U.S. State Department’s Special Envoy Middle East Regional Security (SEMERS) whose mission was to help achieve the Secretary of State’s vision of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through two states living side by side in peace and security.

In February 2007 I returned to the Washington Institute, where I am a Senior Fellow and Director of the since renamed Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence. In this capacity, I am frequently sought after as an analyst and commentator on terrorism issues for major media outlets including CNN, ABC, NBC, CBS, PBS, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, National Public Radio, BBC, al Jazeera, al Arabiya, and more. I have lectured and consulted on terrorism for a variety of government and other

organizations, including the U.S. Departments of State, Homeland Security and Justice, the Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9-11 Commission), the Financial Transactions Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, Department of Justice Canada, and others, and write frequent policy briefs and articles on issues relating to terrorism and U.S. policy. I have also taught as a Professorial Lecturer in International Relations and Strategic Studies at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Along with a collection of journal articles and edited volumes, I am also the author of *Targeting Terror* (Washington Institute, 2002), *Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad* (Yale University Press, 2006), *Negotiating under Fire: Preserving Peace Talks in the Face of Terror Attacks* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2008) and *Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon's Party of God* (Georgetown University Press, 2013).

At the Institute my work includes the study of Middle Eastern terrorist groups, front organizations and state sponsors, the logistical and financial support networks that facilitate their activities, and the extremist and militant ideologies that drive their recruitment and radicalization efforts. In my efforts to study and understand terrorism and militant Islamist ideology I interview experts, officials, academics and others with insight into these issues, both in the United States and Europe and in the Middle East. I engage in private, personal meetings, public conferences, group discussions, and talks that are both on and off the record. I travel to the Middle East regularly, including trips to the Palestinian territories, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Turkey. I also attend conferences and academic and professional lectures, and read books, newspapers, academic and policy journals, and research these materials on the internet (including the websites, video and audio clips and images on sites geared towards counterterrorism and those of terrorist groups and their sympathizers as well). These are the standard sources and methods in the academic and policy communities for developing the kind of specialized knowledge and expertise I have accumulated – and for which I have been awarded and commended – in my field. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has described my research methodology as “the gold standard.”¹ And, in a watershed ruling upholding the constitutionality of the material support statute §2339B, the Supreme Court of the United States cited my work twice to support its position.²

I have developed a particular area of expertise in the field of terrorist radicalization, Homegrown Violent Extremism (HVE), counter-radicalization, and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). Besides writing many articles and reports, I am the co-author of two major studies on these topics, one—*Rewriting the Narrative: An Integrated Strategy for Counterradicalization* (2009)—being the product of a blue-ribbon, bipartisan study group, and the other—*Fighting the Ideological Battle: The Missing Link in U.S. Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism* (2010)—the product of small study group including me, a Washington Institute

¹ See Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling in *US v. Damrah*, at <http://ftp.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F3/412/412.F3d.618.04-4216.html>

² See SCOTUS opinion in *Humanitarian Law Project et al v. Holder et al*, Pp25-26, at <http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-1498.pdf>

colleague (and former U.S. government official, like me), as well as former Bush White House Deputy National Security Advisor Juan Zarate (Republican) and former Clinton (and later Obama) White House National Security Council official Steve Simon (Democrat). I lecture widely on these issues before government, academic and policy audiences; have appeared on television, radio and in print media offering expert commentary and analysis on these issues; participated in United Nations, Global Counterterrorism Forum and other working groups on these issues; and meet and consult with government officials and experts in the field from around the world on these issues as well.

Compiling information from sources such as these, I study and evaluate the information and data I collect, and write about and lecture on my findings. I engage in regular discussions with other experts both to compare notes and as a means of affording myself an ongoing process of peer-review and fact-checking. When providing expert testimony in criminal court cases, I also review evidence provided by the prosecution.

In addition to working at the Institute, I use my specialized expertise to teach and consult, both for the U.S., and other governments and private sector firms. I was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations' task force on terrorist financing, and am a member of the international advisory boards for the Institute for Counter-terrorism (ICT) in Israel and the International Centre for Political Violence & Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) in Singapore. I served as a CTC Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at the U.S. Military Academy (West Point), and I currently hold a senior fellowship at The George Washington University's Homeland Security Policy Institute. I am a life member of The Council on Foreign Relations.

The awards and honors I have received include:

- Exceptional Service Award, U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 2007
- Certificate of Appreciation, United States Central Command Directorate of intelligence, February 2006
- Selected by CNN as one of "The 2005 New Guard: Washington's Next Generation of Newsmakers," April 2005
- European Union Visitors Program (EUVP), 2005
- Visiting Scholar, Security Studies Department, the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, March 2003
- Two U.S. Department of State Speaker and Specialist Grants, April 2002 (lectures in Lithuania) and January 2003 (lectures in Austria)
- Three Letters of Commendation from Deputy Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, July 2000, August 2000, July 2001
- Two Performance Awards, Federal Bureau of Investigation, December 1999, November 2000

- Special Act or Service Award, Federal Bureau of Investigation, September 1999
- Graduate Research Fellow, The Program On Negotiation at Harvard Law School, 1997-1998
- International Security Studies Fellow, International Security Studies Ph.D. Dissertation Fellowship, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1996-1997
- International Security Studies Program Graduate Student Research Grant on the Emerging Issues of Ethnic, Sectarian, and Religious Conflict, William H. Donner Foundation, 1996
- Doctoral Scholarship, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1995-1996
- Sarah Scaife Frank Rockwell Barnett Memorial Grant in International Security Studies, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1994 and 1996

I am frequently called upon to testify before the United States Senate and House of Representatives as an expert on international terrorism, militant Islam, and terrorist financing. I have been qualified as an expert witness and provided expert testimony in many U.S. federal court proceedings and have testified as an expert in several terrorism-related immigration cases in the U.S. and Canada, as well as in terrorism-related cases in France and Denmark. At the request of a Swedish prosecutor, I provided an expert report in a terrorism-related case in Sweden as well.

I am widely published, including my latest book *Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon's 'Party of God'* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press and Hurst Publishers, 2013). A full list of my books, monographs, journal articles, editorials, and policy briefs is available in my professional C.V. I am being compensated for the time I invest in this case at a rate of \$450.00 per hour.

III. The Evolving Terrorist Threat: From “Core” al-Qaeda to Homegrown Violent Extremism

On September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda was the main threat facing the U.S. and its allies. It was a well-funded, centralized, hierarchical organization capable of planning, financing, and directing terrorist operations around the world from its base in Afghanistan. During most of the decade following 9/11, even as its fortunes waxed and waned, the organization remained a potent terrorist threat.³

Beginning in roughly 2009, however, a series of counterterrorism successes significantly degraded al-Qaeda's capabilities. The May 2011 raid in Abbottabad killed Osama bin Laden and robbed the organization of its founder, leader, and figurehead. At the time of the raid, according

³ Charles Allen, Undersecretary of Homeland Security for Intelligence and Analysis in an address to The Washington Institute, "Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Implications for Homeland Security," May 6, 2008, available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC07.php?CID=395>.

to comments made in June 2011 by John Brennan, President Obama's counterterrorism advisor, other operations had already eliminated more than half of al-Qaeda's top leadership, including many of its key financial officers. As early as October 2009, U.S. authorities assessed that targeted measures against the group's financial networks had made it increasingly difficult for the group to hide and transfer money and had pushed al-Qaeda to its "weakest financial condition in several years."⁴ The death of bin Laden and other core al-Qaeda leaders further weakened the organization's financial condition, in part because, as Stuart Levey, the former U.S. Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence in the U.S. Department of the Treasury, has pointed out, bin Laden "was a very important fundraising symbol for Al-Qaeda."⁵ David Cohen, Levey's successor, noted at a September 2011 conference that as of early 2010, "Al-Qaeda not only was stressed financially, it was struggling to allocate funds to plan and execute terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland and Western interests."⁶

Although al-Qaeda continues to receive financial and logistical support even today, its diminished capabilities have helped give rise to a new, multi-layered threat, of which al-Qaeda (now often referred to as "core" al-Qaeda) is just a part. Most of the threat now comes from al-Qaeda regional affiliates, al-Qaeda inspired terrorist cells, and homegrown violent extremists or HVEs.⁷ Indeed, according to the State Department, the terrorist threat has been transformed to the point that it now is a "form of global insurgency."⁸

The al-Qaeda regional affiliates -- which include al-Qaeda in Iraq (AIQ), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) -- are large groups allied with (albeit not controlled by) core al-Qaeda. They can be thought of as "franchise" groups.⁹ According to one article, more than 40 organizations announced formation and pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and bin Laden between January 2005 and April 2007. These groups were located in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Europe, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt, among others.¹⁰ The regional affiliates take some direction from al-Qaeda and are to some degree financially interdependent with it but they are largely self-financed and self-directed.¹¹

⁴ David Cohen, US Department of the Treasury Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing in an address to the ABA/ABA Money Laundering Enforcement Conference, October 12, 2009, available at <http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg317.aspx>

⁵ "What bin Laden's death means for future financing against terrorism," *Marketplace*, May 2, 2011, <http://www.marketplace.org/topics/world/osama-bin-laden-dead/what-bin-ladens-death-means-future-financing-against-terrorism>

⁶ Kirit Radia, "Al Qaeda in Dire Financial Straits, Treasury Official Says," *ABC News*, September 8, 2011, <http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/09/al-qaeda-in-dire-financial-straits-treasury-official-says/>

⁷ Dell Dailey, Policy Watch 1321, "An 'All Elements of Power' Strategy for Combating Terrorism," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, December 18, 2007, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2697>

⁸ US State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 30, 2007, Chapter 1 -- Strategic Assessment, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82727.htm>

⁹ Dell Dailey, *supra*.

¹⁰ Michael Scheuer, "Al Qaeda and Algeria's GSPC: Part of a much bigger picture," April 6, 2007, available at: http://www.jamestown.org/news_details.php?news_id=233.

¹¹ Khaled Wassef, "Al Qaeda's Feverish Hunt For Cash," *CBS News*, October 14, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-5383427-503543.html; Maamoun Youssef, "Al-Qaida in Iraq Appeal

Terrorist cells are small, numerous, and largely autonomous groups that plan and carry out coordinated attacks. For example, according to the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center, there were almost 300 different groups involved in terrorist attacks in 2006, most of them Sunni.¹² These groups also are largely self-financed and self-directed.

An HVE is a person of any citizenship who has mostly lived in the U.S. and who engages in a terrorist activity—usually against his/her home country, to advance an ideological agenda. HVEs are influenced by foreign terrorist organizations but act alone. Because they often radicalize quickly and are usually entirely self-financed and self-directed, they are hard to detect and thwart. Attorney General Eric Holder recently commented that HVEs “keep me up at night, trying to monitor them [and] . . . anticipate what they are going to do.”¹³

The financial struggles of al-Qaeda and its regional franchise groups have led them to rely increasingly on HVEs to achieve their goals. They seek to create a vanguard of like-minded extremists able and willing to carry out attacks with little or no external direction or funding. Their low-cost method for recruiting HVEs is to publish videos, sermons and articles that portray recruits as soldiers, call for specific kinds of attacks (like pressure cooker bombings), and promise salvation for those who carry out attacks in the name of radical Islam. These materials are widely disseminated over the internet, making them far less costly and potentially more effective than a remote training camp. The result has been to enhance exponentially the global jihadi community’s reach at little to no cost.

Indeed, radicalization and recruitment has changed so significantly that, according to then-FBI Assistant Director for Counterterrorism Mark Giuliano, “thousands of extremist websites promote violence to a worldwide audience predisposed to the extremist message, and more of these websites and U.S. citizens are involved in internet radicalization.” And the environment in which people are predisposed to extremist ideology is geographically and demographically diverse. “We have seen internet radicalization in individuals as young as fourteen years old,” Giuliano noted.¹⁴

HVEs do not face many of the hurdles and dangers that earlier terrorist did. Because they attack in their own country, they do not need to pay for travel or suffer the attendant risks. They often are citizens or legal immigrants, speak the prevailing language fluently, and know their

for Fundraising Ideas,” Associated Press, July 26, 2011, available at <http://news.yahoo.com/al-qaida-iraq-appeals-fundraising-ideas-155105146.html>; “Al-Qaeda in Iraq claims bank attack,” *Aljazeera*, June 23, 2010, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2010/06/2010623171726910829.html>; Stephen Braun, “Turn to Kidnapping Showed Bin Laden’s Interest,” Associated Press, June 20, 2011, available at <http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=13882101#.T15hvYE7VdI>

¹² National Counterterrorism Center, Report on Terrorist Incidents - 2006, 30 April 2007, <http://wits.nctc.gov/reports/crot2006nctcannexfinal.pdf>

¹³ http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/holder-homegrown-violent-extremists-keep-me-night_796475.html

¹⁴ Mark Giuliano, Assistant Director, FBI Counterterrorism Division in an address to the Washington Institute, “The Post 9/11 FBI” The Bureau’s Response to Evolving Threats,” April 14, 2011, available at <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/GiulianoStatement20110414.pdf>

way around. And they do not need outside funding because the costs associated with individual acts of terrorism are comparatively insignificant.

In an August 16, 2011, interview with CNN, President Obama stressed that pressure on al-Qaeda has left it “a much weaker organization with much less capability than they had just two or three years ago.” As a result, he outlined, spectacular attacks are less likely, but small scale attacks may be more frequent: “The most likely scenario that we have to guard against right now ends up being more of a lone wolf operation than a large, well-coordinated terrorist attack.”¹⁵

Despite efforts to counter violent extremist ideologies, the underlying extremist narrative offered by al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and other like-minded groups and fellow ideological travelers remains strong and compelling for many Muslims. This narrative charges that the United States and the West more broadly are at war with Islam and that the Muslim world or “ummah” must unify to defeat this threat to Islam and to reestablish the Caliphate. As evidence for their narrative, extremist groups point to the war in Iraq, Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, U.S. support for Israel, and Washington’s reluctance to compel changes in authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.

While radicalization would hardly be surprising among those personally affected, such as detainees at Abu Ghraib, this radical narrative extends to distant witnesses of these policies. Instrumental to this wider success is the group’s ability to connect individuals’ local grievances to this global narrative. In fact, there is strong evidence that al-Qaeda’s efforts to spread its destructive ideology have encouraged terrorist groups previously focused on more local targets, such as AQIM, to shift their ideological focus to the global struggle. By appropriating the al-Qaeda brand, other “homegrown terrorists” have become far more dangerous than they would otherwise have been. And terrorists inspired by, but with no direct ties to, al-Qaeda also continue to perpetuate violence globally justified by al-Qaeda’s global narrative. Indeed, when the radical global narrative of jihadi groups is most successful it makes foreign conflicts -- Afghanistan, Chechnya, Syria, etc. -- feel immediate and near for Muslim youth regardless of whether they ever visited these regions let alone fought in their conflicts.

The reasons that the extremist narrative finds fertile soil in so many societies around the world are as various as the societies themselves. Some young Muslims respond to a radicalizing message because they feel excluded from their own societies, trapped in poverty or hopelessness within authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and beyond. Others, well-off and well-educated, live in Western democracies but struggle with issues of belonging and identity and find that the extremist message resonates with their experience and circumstances. Some -- either immigrants themselves or descendants of immigrants from countries suffering from war, natural disasters, political and/or economic repression, war, etc. -- are drawn to this radical and violent narrative

¹⁵ “Obama: Biggest terror fear is the lone wolf,” *CNN*, August 16, 2011, <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2011/08/16/obama-biggest-terror-fear-is-the-lone-wolf/>

based on national and/or religious affinity for their ancestral lands and empathy for the suffering of family, friends or fellow nationals still suffering there.

In the past few years, the situation in Syria has greatly intensified Western governments' concern about radicalization. The sectarian nature of the civil war has attracted many who do not necessarily see themselves as radical Islamists, but instead feel that they are fighting a defensive jihad to protect Sunni Muslims against the atrocities of Bashar al-Assad and his Alawite sect. A number of factors have combined to make the flow of Western fighters to Syria particularly alarming for their governments. Not only has the conflict attracted more European Muslim fighters than any other to date,¹⁶ but the radicalization process itself has been unusually fast, and significant numbers of young Muslims and even minors have gone. By the end of January 2014, nearly 2,000 Europeans were estimated to have joined the fight.¹⁷ A study by Germany's federal state Hesse found that some jihadists became radicalized in a matter of weeks.¹⁸ Extreme Salafist groups are targeting schools for recruitment. "The contact is established by handing over a Quran and then, almost like a drug dealer, they get these young people hooked. So the schools have become a recruitment center, and this really frightens us and is a huge challenge," said the interior minister for the German state of Hesse.¹⁹ Nor is this increased pace of radicalization limited to Germany: "What we note is the rapidity of the phenomenon," said French Interior Minister Manuel Valls of the radicalization of French Muslims.²⁰

Along with virtual or online radicalization, direct or in-person contact can also be an important factor in terrorist radicalization. Vulnerable potential recruits generally have political or economic grievances or a sense of alienation (typically in Western societies). Extremists can then exploit these to encourage their targets to embrace more radical ideas and actions, which give them a sense of purpose and agency. Some of the most common locations for the initial contact are mosques, prisons, and schools, as well as online. Radical, charismatic preachers in particular, speaking from a position of religious authority, can have a strong influence in guiding what are typically dissatisfied young men towards extremism.

¹⁶ Thomas Hegghammer, "Number of foreign fighters from Europe in Syria is historically unprecedented. Who should be worried?" *Washington Post*, November 27, 2013, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2013/11/27/number-of-foreign-fighters-from-europe-in-syria-is-historically-unprecedented-who-should-be-worried/>.

¹⁷ Alexandra Hudson, "Insight: Europe Worried as More and Younger Recruits Join Syria Battle," *Reuters*, January 23, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/22/us-syria-crisis-europe-jihadists-insight-idUSBREA0L1EF20140122>.

¹⁸ Alexandra Hudson, "Insight: Europe Worried as More and Younger Recruits Join Syria Battle," *Reuters*, January 22, 2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/22/us-syria-crisis-europe-jihadists-insight-idUSBREA0L1EF20140122>.

¹⁹ Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, "'Jihad Tourism': From Germany To The Syrian Battlefield," *NPR*, December 22, 2013, <http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2013/12/21/256002951/jihad-tourism-from-germany-to-the-syrian-battlefield>.

²⁰ Michael Birnbaum, "E.U. security officials note increased flow of fighters to Syria's civil war," *Washington Post*, December 5, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/eu-security-officials-note-increased-flow-of-fighters-to-syrias-civil-war/2013/12/05/5226dbd6-5de2-11e3-8d24-31c016b976b2_story.html.

Schools are a favorite haunt of recruiters for radical Islam. “Campuses are seen as places full of young people who are interested in ideas,” notes a report from Danish intelligence. Many Muslim students in Western countries may have grown up as immigrants and struggled to integrate into society. Extremist groups thus find Muslim students to be a target-rich pool. “Moreover,” concludes the report, “one must not underestimate the effect of boredom and identity-seeking for young people.”²¹

A British government official, speaking about individuals’ connection to extremist ideology, put it well: “There is no single path that leads people to violent extremism,” he said. “Social, foreign policy, economic and personal factors all lead people to throw their lot in with extremists.”²² To be clear: there is no one suggestive or predictive dynamic that leads to radicalization. Indeed, terrorist recruitment and radicalization trends are continually evolving, as a senior US official with the Department of Homeland Security noted in a recent lecture.²³

Radicalizing material, and virtual communities that discuss and plan violent jihadi activities are readily accessible online. Indeed, the first finding of a U.S. Senate report on the threat of homegrown radicalization highlighted the fact that “violent Islamist extremists use the Internet to recruit, radicalize, and mobilize individuals -- including Americans.” The case highlighted in that report, the authors warn, “is likely a harbinger, not an outlier, for violent Islamist extremism online, not just in the United States, but globally.”²⁴ Al-Qaeda’s media wing, *as Sahab*, released an English language video in March 2010 titled “A Call to Arms” featuring Adam Gadahn, an American-born spokesman for the group. In a video intended for jihadists in the US, Israel, and the United Kingdom, Gadahn praises Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hassan as a “trailblazer” who did not attract law enforcement attention by training abroad or relying on accomplices.²⁵ In an early June 2011 English language video titled “Do Not Rely on Others, Take the Task Upon Yourself,” Gadahn calls on Muslims living in the West to carry out individual operations. In the video he says,

Muslims in the West have to remember that they are perfectly placed to play an important and decisive part in the Jihad against the Zionists and crusaders, and to do major damage to the

²¹ Tomas Precht, “Home grown terrorism and Islamist radicalisation in Europe: From conversion to terrorism,” Danish Ministry of Justice, December 2007, 60-67, http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/sites/default/files/media/Arbejdsomraader/Forskning/Forskningspuljen/2011/2007/Home_grown_terrorism_and_Islamist_radicalisation_in_Europe_-_an_assessment_of_influencing_factors_2_.pdf

²² “Top UK Spy Says Credit Crunch a Security Threat,” CNN, January 7, 2009, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/01/07/jonathan.evans.mi5.terrorists/index.html>

²³ John Cohen, “Revisiting US CVE Efforts One Year after the Boston Bombing,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 28, 2014, <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/revisiting-u.s.-cve-efforts-one-year-after-the-boston-bombing>

²⁴ “Zachary Chesser: A Case Study in Online Islamist Radicalization and its Meaning for the Threat of Homegrown Terrorism,” A Report by Majority and Minority Staff, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, February 2012

²⁵ Scott Stewart, Jihadism: The Grassroots Paradox, STRATFOR, March 18, 2010, available online http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100317_jihadism_grassroots_paradox?ip_auth_redirect=1

enemies of Islam, waging war on their religion, sacred places, and things, and brethren. This is a golden opportunity and a blessing.²⁶

According to a study prepared by the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service, violent extremists use the internet as a means to disseminate radical ideologies; anonymity has “allowed jihadist ideas to spread exponentially.” The study further notes that “the internet has consequently become a breeding ground for new jihadist individuals and networks.”²⁷

A report by the United Nations’ Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) breaks down the means by which the internet is utilized for terrorist purposes into six overlapping categories: (1) propaganda (including recruitment, incitement, and radicalization); (2) financing; (3) training; (4) planning an act of terrorism; (5) executing an act of terrorism; and (6) cyber-attacks.²⁸

In the context of discussing online training, the UNODC report specifically highlights the role played by *Inspire* magazine:

For example, *Inspire* is an online magazine allegedly published by Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula with the stated objective of enabling Muslims to train for jihad at home. It contains a large amount of ideological material aimed at encouraging terrorism, including statements attributed to Osama Bin Laden, Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri and other well-known Al-Qaida figures. The fall 2010 edition included practical instructional material on how to adapt a four-wheel-drive vehicle to carry out an attack on members of the public and how a lone individual could launch an indiscriminate attack by shooting a gun from a tower. The publication even suggested a target city for such an attack, in order to increase the chances of killing a member of the Government.²⁹

Inspire magazine is of particular concern because it combines slick graphics and colloquial language to create a product that is “a streamlined and seamless fusion of ideologically driven material with pragmatic instructional and skill-building content.”³⁰ In other words, *Inspire* is so successful and dangerous because it includes not only material that increases motivation to engage in acts of terrorism, but also practical information that lowers the barrier to entry to terrorism and articles that empower readers to engage in such activities on their own. Many articles press upon the reader a sense of urgency and obligation to carry out acts of

²⁶ Matthew Cole, ““New Al Qaeda Video: American Muslims Should Buy Guns, Start Shooting People,” ABC News, June 3, 2011, <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaeda-video-buy-automatic-weapons-start-shooting/story?id=13704264>.

²⁷ Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations of the Netherlands, General Intelligence and Security Service, “Jihadism on the Web: A Breeding ground for Jihad in the modern age,” January 2012

²⁸ “The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in collaboration with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, 2012, <https://info.publicintelligence.net/UNODC-TerroristInternet.pdf>

²⁹ “The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in collaboration with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, 2012, <https://info.publicintelligence.net/UNODC-TerroristInternet.pdf>

³⁰ Anthony F. Lemieux, Jarret M. Brachman, Jason Levitt & Jay Wood, “Inspire Magazine: A Critical Analysis of its Significance through the Lens of the Information, Motivation, and Behavioral Skills Model.” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 1-18, 2012

terrorism, especially in the West. Put more succinctly: *Inspire* fosters “a do-it-yourself ethos resulting in terrorism behaviors.”³¹

Inspire enables this militant entrepreneurship not only by radicalizing individuals to engage in violence but by empowering them to do so on their own. Consider, for example, “How to Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of your Mom,” which provides step-by-step instructions -- with glossy photos -- on how to build a pressure cooker bomb. The magazine stresses that “it is important to put a quantity of small nails on the surface of the iron pipe from the inside,” later adding that if steel pellets are not available to be used as shrapnel then nails can be used for that as well.³²

Timing and location are often important components of terrorist plotting. Terrorists aim to carry out attacks on significant or symbolic dates such as on holidays or at public events. They also seek targets where maximum casualties can be attained. This not only leads to more people dead and wounded, but also to more people watching, more media coverage, and therefore more effective terrorizing of society.

Western law enforcement agencies have noted the challenge *Inspire* presents for efforts to maintain public safety. For example, the Oregon state intelligence fusion center reported on one edition of *Inspire*, noting that it “emphasized relatively simple attack methods such as random shootings at restaurants and ramming pedestrians with a motor vehicle that can easily be carried out by a single actor.” It added that “the authors are providing advice that would help to minimize opportunities for law enforcement and citizens to observe and disrupt an attack,” and expressed concern that the “authors emphasize new and creative attacks that will inflict maximum casualties and economic damage. As the holiday season approaches, there is greater opportunity to inflict maximum casualties and economic damage.”³³

Similarly, commenting on the publication of the second edition of *Inspire*, the FBI and US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) expressed concern that “[b]oth editions instructed Muslims located in the West to perform operations where they reside or travel overseas to participate in violent jihad.”³⁴ The FBI/DHS report warned:

We have no indications that the timing of the publication of this magazine or any tactics described therein are related to any specific, ongoing AQAP plotting against the US Homeland. We are concerned, however, the second edition of the colloquial English-language magazine

³¹ Anthony F. Lemieux, Jarret M. Brachman, Jason Levitt & Jay Wood, “Inspire Magazine: A Critical Analysis of its Significance through the Lens of the Information, Motivation, and Behavioral Skills Model,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 1-18, 2012

³² *Inspire Magazine*, volume :1 “Make a bomb in the kitchen of your Mom: The AQ Chef,” *Inspire*, Summer 2010, p.33-40

³³ “Analysis of Key Articles from the Fall 2010 Edition of *Inspire Magazine*,” Informational Bulletin, Oregon TITAN Fusion Center Bulletin, <https://info.publicintelligence.net/Oregon-InspireWarning.pdf>

³⁴ “Second Edition of *Inspire Magazine*: Continues to Encourage Attacks in the West,” Joint Intelligence Bulletin, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Department of Homeland Security, October 15, 2010, <https://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-Inspire2Warning.pdf>

could appeal to certain Western individuals and encourage them to conduct attacks in the United States in the future. The second edition is further evidence that AQAP is trying to establish a following among a Western audience, while enhancing the group's resonance through a consistent media campaign focused at English speakers. We encourage reporting of suspicious activity to appropriate authorities and encourage our homeland security, military, and law enforcement partners to remain vigilant.³⁵

Radicalization efforts have also made their way into social media such as Facebook and Twitter. At a lecture titled "Confronting the Changing Face of al-Qaeda Propaganda," Ambassador Alberto Fernandez, the coordinator of the U.S. State Department's Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications explained:

Over the years, al-Qaeda and its fellow travelers have transitioned to new platforms and mechanisms as circumstances have changed. As opportunities to use broadcast media became more constrained, they shifted to password-protected forums and in late 2012 the extremists' migration to social media such as Twitter and beyond accelerated.³⁶

IV. Radical Materials Linked to Mr. Tsarnaev

Materials found on the computer/s of or otherwise in possession of Mr. Tsarnaev, and which were provided to this expert for review, include materials associated with established jihadi ideologues and terrorist operatives. Much of the material is expressly violent and terroristic in nature and useful to a person preparing to commit an act of terrorism. Other materials are intended to present a radical worldview designed to stir up the emotions of Muslim youth and encourage action, specifically violence, which is presented as action in defense of the faith. The fact that Mr. Tsarnaev viewed these materials is highly significant in that it places him well within the global jihadist milieu; these and other materials, including his "note in the boat," lay out his radicalization over time. Mr. Tsarnaev's own writings echo the global narrative laid out in these materials, including the concepts of jihad as a duty, martyrdom and pursuit of rewards in the afterlife (akhira), praise for mujahideen, engaging in violence in the name of Islam as a means of gaining entry to paradise (jannah) and to the highest levels therein (firdaus) which is reserved for the prophets, pious people and martyrs, the imperatives of recreating an Islamic Caliphate and of forgoing national and ethnic affiliations in favor of seeing oneself solely as a member of the Muslim nation or community (ummah), as well as reference to geographic regions by historical Islamic names instead of their current ones (such as Kavkaz for the Caucasus and Khorasan for Afghanistan and surrounding areas).

Prominent examples of the violent Islamist extremists featured in this material include:

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Alberto Fernandez, "Confronting the Changing Face of al-Qaeda Propaganda," Counterterrorism Lecture, delivered at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 25, 2014, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/confronting-the-changing-face-of-al-qaeda-propaganda>.

* Abdullah Azzam was a mentor of Osama bin Laden and has been called the “father of the global jihad.”³⁷ Azzam actively recruited Muslims around the world to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s and was a prolific writer of articles and books advocating jihad, including suicide operations. Describing “the rise of Bin Laden and al-Qaeda” in the period from 1988 to 1992, the *9/11 Commission Report* noted the following:

Mosques, schools, and boardinghouses served as recruiting stations in parts of the world, including the United States. Some were set up by Islamic extremists or their financial backers. Bin Laden had an important part in this activity. He and the cleric Azzam had joined in creating a “Bureau of Services” (Mektab al Khidmat, or MAK), which channeled recruits into Afghanistan.³⁸

“Join the Caravan,” perhaps the most famous of Abdullah Azzam’s radical manifestos, is a call to jihad. Consider, for example, the preface to the second edition: “We hope that Allah will provide us with sincerity and steadfastness and that He will accept our deeds from us, and bring us our end in martyrdom.” Among its principles, the monograph informs that “Jihad is the highest peak of Islam,” that “Jihad is the most excellent form of worship,” and warns that “a person who discourages people from jihad is like the one who discourages people from fasting. Whoever advises an able Muslim not to go for jihad is just like the one who advises him to eat in Ramadan while he is healthy and in residence.”³⁹ Extremists frequently cite Azzam as an inspiration, and Brookings fellow and former CIA officer Bruce Riedel described Azzam’s works as “must-reads for any jihadist today.”⁴⁰

* Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi has been described as the “theorist and spiritual mentor of the Jordanian Salafist movement,” and is an influential preacher throughout the Middle East for radical and often violent Islamists.⁴¹ One of his most notable claims to fame is his status as a mentor for Abu Musab al-Zarqawi when both were imprisoned together in Jordan in the 1990s, though Maqdisi later criticized his actions.⁴² Zarqawi became infamous for his thuggish brutality in the Iraq insurgency of the mid-2000s. According to Joas Wagemakers, author of a book on Maqdisi, the Jordanian “praise[d] the 9/11 hijackers for executing such a well-planned operation and state[d] that jihad needs more people like them.”⁴³ Maqdisi corresponded with al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, calling him, “our beloved brother, the Sheikh, the Commander, the Mujahid.”⁴⁴ Kavkaz Center, a website affiliated with the Caucasus Emirate, published a video of

³⁷ Bruce Riedel, “The 9/11 Attacks’ Spiritual Father,” *Brookings Institution*, September 11, 2011, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/09/11-riedel>.

³⁸ *The 9/11 Commission Report*, authorized edition (New York: Norton, 2004), pages 56-57; available online at <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf>

³⁹ Abdullah Azzam, *Join the Caravan*, CARE International (1995)

⁴⁰ Bruce Riedel, *supra*.

⁴¹ Tamer al-Samadi, “Jordan Salafist leader, freed, quiet so far on ISIS-Nusra rift,” *al-Monitor*, June 20, 2014, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/06/jordan-salafist-maqdisi-released-prison-silence-isis-nusra.html>.

⁴² Joas Wagemakers, “Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi: A Counter-Terrorism Asset?” *CTC Sentinel*, May 15, 2008, <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/abu-muhammad-al-maqdisi-a-counter-terrorism-asset>.

⁴³ *Ibid*.

⁴⁴ Thomas Joscelyn, “Influential Jordanian ideologue argues against Islamic State’s caliphate,” *Long War Journal*,

Maqdisi in August 2014. Maqdisi sent his condolences for the death of their leader Dokku Umarov, lauded Umarov for sending fighters to Syria, and called on his “brothers in the Caucasus” to obey their new leader.⁴⁵

* Omar Ibn al-Khattab, a native Jordanian (some say Saudi, his tribe straddles the Jordanian-Saudi border), was a jihadist leader best known for fighting alongside Chechen Islamists against Russia. He took part in the first Chechen war in 1995 and the second war in 1999. Al-Khattab fought in Tajikistan and against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and was reported to have set up training camps in Chechnya modeled on those of Afghanistan.⁴⁶ While in Afghanistan, Khattab established a relationship with Osama bin Laden, later receiving financial support from bin Laden for the Chechnya effort.⁴⁷ A prolific producer of videotapes for recruiting purposes, Khattab became an influential figure among Chechen jihadists, particularly in light of supportive fatwas from Saudi clerics.⁴⁸ Khattab was killed in April 2002, reportedly by a poisoned letter sent by Russian intelligence services.⁴⁹

Islamist unrest in the Russian republic of Chechnya dates back to the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Separatists attempted to declare independence in 1991, with conflict turning to an outright two-year war between Chechnya and Russia in 1994.⁵⁰ Al-Qaeda funneled fighters and materiel through Turkey and Azerbaijan in support of the Islamist separatists.⁵¹ A second war then broke out in 1999 after Chechen militants supported fellow separatist Muslims in the neighboring republic of Dagestan.⁵² The Second Chechen War was followed by internal Islamist conflict between Sufis and the fundamentalist Salafis. The more moderate Sufis allied with the Russian state, tainting their image for many Chechens.⁵³ Hundreds of experienced Chechen militants are now fighting in Syria, where the history of their conflict with Russia garners automatic respect from other Sunni fighters.⁵⁴

The Chechen jihad has long served as a radicalization platform, rallying point and battleground for jihadists from around the world. Indeed, some of the most famous jihadi leaders

July 2, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2014/07/moral_pressures_had.php.

⁴⁵ “Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi praises Caucasus Mujahideen in Syria,” Kavkaz Center, August 8, 2014, <http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/content/2014/08/08/19439.shtml>.

⁴⁶ “Obituary: Chechen rebel Khattab,” BBC, April 26, 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1952053.stm>.

⁴⁷ Shaun Waterman, “Chechnya terror groups and ties to Al Qaeda,” *Washington Times*, April 19, 2013, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/apr/19/chechnya-terror-groups-and-ties-al-qaeda/?page=all>.

⁴⁸ Lorenzo Vidino, “How Chechnya Became a Breeding Ground for Terror,” *Middle East Quarterly*, 2005, <http://www.investigativeproject.org/268/how-chechnya-became-a-breeding-ground-for-terror#>.

⁴⁹ “Obituary: Chechen rebel Khattab,” *supra*.

⁵⁰ Preeti Bhattacharji, “Backgrounder: Chechen Terrorism,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 8, 2010, <http://www.cfr.org/separatist-terrorism/chechen-terrorism-russia-chechnya-separatist/p9181>.

⁵¹ Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror*, (New York: Random House, 2002), 113.

⁵² Bhattacharji, “Backgrounder: Chechen Terrorism,” *supra*.

⁵³ “Chechnya and Dagestan: Islamists in Russia,” *The Economist*, April 27, 2013, <http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21576728-boston-bombs-have-put-new-focus-russias-islamist-republics-islamists-russia>.

⁵⁴ Adam Taylor, “Why being Chechen is a badge of honor for Islamist militants,” *Washington Post*, July 3, 2014, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/07/03/why-being-chechen-is-a-badge-of-honor-for-islamist-militants/>.

went or attempted to go to the region. For example, 9/11 mastermind Khaled Sheikh Mohammed tried to join Ibn al-Khattab in Chechnya but only got as far as Azerbaijan, according to the 9/11 Commission Report.⁵⁵ Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri also attempted to reach Chechnya in 1997 but was arrested by Russian police in neighboring Dagestan.⁵⁶ The centrality of the Chechen jihad for the global jihadi movement is encapsulated by Zawahiri's discussion of the importance of the Chechen conflict for the jihadist movement in his book, *Fursan taht Rayat ar-Rasul (Knights under the Prophet's Banner)*:

The liberation of the Caucasus would constitute a hotbed of jihad (or fundamentalism as the United States describes it) and that region would become the shelter of thousands of Muslim mujahideen from various parts of the Islamic world, particularly Arab parts. This poses a direct threat to the United States, represented by the growing support for the jihadist movement everywhere in the Islamic world. If the Chechens and other Caucasian mujahideen reach the shores of the oil-rich Caspian Sea, the only thing that will separate them from Afghanistan will be the neutral state of Turkmenistan. This will form a mujahid Islamic belt to the south of Russia that will be connected in the east to Pakistan, which is brimming with mujahideen movements in Kashmir. The belt will be linked to the south with Iran and Turkey that are sympathetic to the Muslims of Central Asia. This will break the cordon that is struck around the Muslim Caucasus and allow it to communicate with the Islamic world in general. Furthermore the liberation of the Muslim Caucasus will lead to the fragmentation of the Russian Federation and will help escalate the jihad movements that already exist in the republics of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, whose governments get Russian backing against those jihadist movements. The fragmentation of the Russian Federation on the rock of the fundamentalist movement and at the hands of the Muslims of the Caucasus and Central Asia will topple a basic ally of the United States in its battle against the Islamic jihadist reawakening.⁵⁷

The Chechen jihad continues to inspire homegrown violent extremists, including individuals here in the United States. For example, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs authored a report on Zachary Adam Chesser, describing his story as “a case study in online Islamist radicalization and its meaning for the threat of homegrown terrorism.” Chesser, who ultimately pleaded guilty to three felonies, including attempting to provide material support to the Somali al-Qaeda affiliated group al-Shabaab, corresponded with Committee Staff. In one letter, Chesser explains how the Chechen cause in general, and specifically videos of Khattab, first motivated him and drew him toward jihadi causes:

As for me, I was first engrossed with Chechnya due to the videos of Khattab. As an American, one is trained from birth to view Russia as evil, so when they more or less carry out genocide against a people, then it is easy to want the other side to win. Then as a Muslim who sees a war against his people by such a power, it is very easy to want to go defend them. However, eventually I saw that Khattab was long dead, it was no longer traditional war, and this changed things for me.... As I was discovering this, Somalia popped up on al-Awlaqi's website, and it had all the same pros of Chechnya, but none of its cons.”⁵⁸

⁵⁵ *The 9-11 Commission Report* (New York: W.W. Norton Co, 2004), p. 149.

⁵⁶ Lawrence Wright, "The Man behind bin Laden," *The New Yorker*, Sept. 16, 2002.

⁵⁷ Ayman al-Zawahiri, *Knights under the Prophet's Banner*, excerpts in *Asharq al-Awsat* (London), Dec. 2, 2001, in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report, Near East South Asia*, Jan. 10, 2002

⁵⁸ “Zachary Chesser: A Case Study in Online Islamist Radicalization and its Meaning for the Threat of Homegrown

* Said Abu Saad al-Buryati (also spelled Buryatski) became a prominent Islamist preacher for the Caucasus Emirate, a Chechen Sunni nationalist organization,⁵⁹ around 2008. The Caucasus Emirate was sanctioned by the US Treasury Department⁶⁰ and designated as a global terrorist organization by the State Department in 2011, which accused it of using “bombings, shootings and attempted assassinations to provoke a revolution and expel the Russian government from the North Caucasus region.”⁶¹ Buryati was born in 1982 under the name Aleksandr Tikhomirov, in the Russian republic of Buryatia. Although he grew up as a Buddhist, he converted to Islam as a teenager and studied Islamic theology at al-Askhar University in Cairo. Buryati was eventually expelled from Egypt and returned to Russia. In May 2008, Buryati left Moscow for the Caucasus and participated both directly and indirectly in several violent operations.⁶² Though it was initially believed that Buryati carried out a suicide bombing at a Russian police station in Nazran,⁶³ it later transpired that he had only planned and filmed the attack.⁶⁴ Other videos posted to YouTube show him preaching radical Islam and wearing camouflage. He was also suspected of involvement in a November 2009 bombing of the Nevsky Express train, which killed 27 people. Russian forces killed Buryati and eight other suspected militants in March 2010 during a raid on the village of Ekazhevo in the North Caucasus republic of Ingushetia.⁶⁵

* Anwar al-Awlaki, the author of “44 Ways to Support Jihad” and many other articles and lectures, was an influential American Muslim in al-Qaeda, an ideologue who played a significant role in recruiting several people charged with terrorism or convicted of terror activity in Western countries. By speaking in vernacular, American English he was able to reach an especially broad audience and make his violent Jihadi message accessible and understandable to non-Arabic speakers around the world and especially in the United States and Great Britain, where he lived and lectured at various times. “Jihad,” he once said, “is becoming as American as apple pie and as British as afternoon tea.”⁶⁶

Terrorism,” A Report by Majority and Minority Staff, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, February 2012

⁵⁹ “Caucasus Emirate,” Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium,
<http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/caucasus-emirate-ce>.

⁶⁰ “Recent OFAC Actions,” US Treasury Department, May 26, 2011, <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/20110525.aspx>.

⁶¹ “Designation of Caucasus Emirate,” US State Department, May 26, 2011,
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/164312.htm>.

⁶² Gordon M. Hahn, “Sheik Said Abu Saad Buryatskii: New Basaev of the Caucasus,” Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program.

⁶³ “Ingushetia Bombing Claimed By Rebels’ Spiritual Leader,” *Radio Free Europe*, August 27, 2009,
http://www.rferl.org/content/Ingushetia_Bombing_Claimed_By_Rebels_Spiritual_Leader/1809112.html.

⁶⁴ Mairbek Vatchagaev, “Killing of Said Buryatsky Unlikely to Deter North Caucasus Insurgency,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, volume 7, issue 48, March 11, 2010,
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36146#.U_4lMvldWCk.

⁶⁵ “Russian ‘Bin Laden’ killed by Moscow’s special forces,” *The Telegraph*, March 7, 2010,
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/7393272/Russian-Bin-Laden-killed-by-Moscows-special-forces.html>.

⁶⁶ Scott Shane and Souad Mekhennet, “Imam’s Path from Condemning Terror to Preaching Jihad,” *New York Times*,

Awlaki engaged in direct email correspondence with Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hassan and the would-be Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad. He was also the head of operations for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and was killed by an American drone strike in Yemen in 2011.⁶⁷ Awlaki was a contributor to numerous issues of *Inspire*, calling for attacks against America and the rest of the West.⁶⁸ In the first issue of *Inspire* Awlaki stated, “I specifically invite the youth to either fight in the West or join their brothers in the fronts of jihad: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia.”⁶⁹ Awlaki’s famous sermon series, including The Here After Series, The Day of Judgment Series, The Byzantine Empire Series, The Lives of the Prophets series, and more, span the spectrum from blatant radicalization and calls to engage in terrorism and militancy to religious lectures lacking commentary on political, Jihadi or even current affairs. Indeed, according to study published by The International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence at King’s College London, the lectures that fit into the latter category appear to have helped Awlaki build his fan base, some of whom appear to have started off seeking general religious background and guidance and came across his lectures on the basic tenets of the Muslim faith. Some appear to have continued listening to other, more radical lectures, heading down a now well-worn path of radicalization.⁷⁰ In the words of Johari Abdul-Malik, an Imam who at one time was a fellow staff member with Awlaki at a Virginia mosque, Awlaki’s strictly scriptural lectures may not involve calls to jihad but they are still dangerous. Even this somewhat benign Awlaki material “becomes a gateway for the unsuspecting.”⁷¹

Awlaki’s radicalization of Americans to fight in foreign jihadi conflicts appears to have included the Chechen jihad. When he lived in Colorado, Awlaki reportedly encouraged a Saudi student at the University of Denver to travel to Chechnya to join the jihad against the Russians, according to an account in the *New York Times*.⁷² At least one Colorado student reportedly dropped out of college to join jihadists in Bosnia and Chechnya and died fighting abroad.⁷³

Meanwhile, Awlaki continued to foment violence and call for terrorist attacks targeting civilians even from the grave. The eighth edition of *Inspire Magazine* came out after Awlaki’s

May 8, 2010

⁶⁷ Thomas Hegghammer, “The case for chasing al-Awlaki,” *Foreign Policy*, November 24, 2010, http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/11/24/the_case_for_chasing_al_awlaki; “Anwar al-Awlaki Fast Facts,” *CNN Library*, August 23, 2013, <http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/23/world/meast/anwar-al-awlaki-fast-facts/>.

⁶⁸ Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens, “Voice of Terror,” *Foreign Policy*, January 18, 2011, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/18/voice_of_terror.

⁶⁹ Anwar al-Awlaki, “Shak Anwar’s Message to the American People and Muslims in the West,” *Inspire*, Summer 2010, Vol. 1, page 58, available at <http://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/aqap-inspire-magazine-volume-1-uncorrupted.pdf>.

⁷⁰ Jack Barclay, *Challenging the Influence of Anwar Al-Awlaki*, Developments in Radicalisation and Political Violence Series, The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, September 2010, http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/12839653451CSR_ChallengingtheInfluenceofAnwarAlAwlaki.pdf

⁷¹ Scott Shane and Souad Mekhennet, “Imam’s Path from Condemning Terror to Preaching Jihad,” *New York Times*, May 8, 2010

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ J.M. Berger, “The Myth of Anwar al-Awlaki,” *Foreign Policy*, August 10, 2011

death but included a five page article entitled, “Targeting the Populations of Countries at War with Muslims.” In the article, Awlaki justifies the use of chemical and biological weapons, bombing and firearm attacks, and the killing of women and children. Jihad, Awlaki wrote, allows a shooter “to shoot randomly at crowds.” Bombing attacks targeting civilians are also permitted, Awlaki wrote: “Muslims are allowed to target the populations of countries that are at war with Muslims by bombings or fire-arms attacks or other forms of attacks that inevitably lead to the deaths of non-combatants.”⁷⁴

Also found in Mr. Tsarnaev’s possession were several editions of *Inspire* Magazine, the English-language jihadi magazine which has been described as “a slick Web-based publication, heavy on photographs and graphics” and was first published in July 2010. Geared towards English-speaking Muslims worldwide, the publication proclaims to have been started in an effort to “touch upon all major issues while giving attention to the events unfolding in the Arabian Peninsula as we witness it on the ground.”⁷⁵ Filled with anti-American, anti-Semitic, and anti-Western articles written by well-known extremist clerics, and featuring the personal stories of individuals who trained with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan (complete with a suggested packing list for those eager to follow in those footsteps), the magazine even includes step-by-step instructions on how to “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.” The magazine professes to inspire (thus the name) a “revival in comprehension and endeavor” of jihad.⁷⁶ “They’re not looking to outdo the readership of the *Economist* or *Time* magazine,” said Bruce Riedel, a former senior CIA officer. “They only need to inspire one or two people to blow something up in the right place and they’ll make back their start-up costs.”⁷⁷

In fact, *Inspire* magazine’s influence has extended from the virtual world, where it is disseminated, to the real world, where its influence has been noted in terrorism plots around the globe. Consider several American cases:

- Jose Pimentel, who ultimately pleaded guilty to plotting a bombing in New York, was arrested by police just as he was finishing the assembly of a pipe bomb in his apartment in November 2011. He admitted downloading an article from *Inspire* magazine called “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.”⁷⁸ According to New York detectives, video showed Pimentel “following precisely the instructions from the *Inspire* magazine article....” He also maintained a website advocating violence against United States citizens and containing links to *Inspire* material, including the home bomb-making

⁷⁴ Tim Lister and Paul Cruikshank, “From the Grave, al-Awlaki Calls for Bio-Chem Attacks on U.S.,” CNN, May 2, 2013, <http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/05/02/from-the-grave-al-awlaki-calls-for-bio-chem-attacks-on-the-u-s/>

⁷⁵ “Letter from the Editor,” *Inspire*, Supper 1431, 2010, pg. 2

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Bob Drogin, “The ‘Vanity Fair’ of Al Qaeda,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 26, 2010, <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/26/nation/la-na-terror-magazine-20101126>

⁷⁸ Shayna Jacobs and Larry McShane, “‘Lone wolf’ terror suspect Jose Pimental pleads guilty to plot to blow up soldiers returning from battle,” *New York Daily News*, February 19, 2014, <http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/lone-wolf-terror-suspect-pleads-guilty-article-1.1619569#ixzz2vmgXAKEQ>.

article. Pimentel also delivered a flash drive to an NYPD informant that included six issues of *Inspire* magazine (including the bomb-making article), a 417-page manual entitled “Organic Chemistry of Explosives,” and a 374-page manual entitled “The Preparatory Manual of Explosives.”⁷⁹

- When authorities arrested Naser Jason Abdo, a U.S. soldier who had gone absent without leave from his military base in Fort Campbell, Kentucky, they found on his person a .40 caliber handgun, ammunition, bomb-making materials, and the *Inspire* article “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.”⁸⁰ Abdo was ultimately sentenced to two consecutive life terms for attempted use of a weapon of mass destruction and possession of a weapon intended for use in a federal crime.⁸¹
- In a plot targeting the New York Federal Reserve Bank in October 2012, Ouazi Nafis triggered what he thought was a detonator for a 1,000-pound truck bomb in front of the bank. The bomb was a fake, and he was arrested. Prior to his arrest, however, Nafis provided a letter explaining his motives to an informant he believed was tied to al-Qaeda in the hope his letter would be printed in *Inspire* magazine.⁸²

There are several other U.S. plots with ties to *Inspire*, from the Fort Hood, Texas, shooting attack carried out by Nidal Hassan, to the New York plot by brothers Raees Alam Qazi and Sheheryar Alam Qazi, to the Chicago plot by Adel Daoud.⁸³ But *Inspire*-linked cases are not limited to the United States. Four individuals planning a bombing based on instructions found in *Inspire* in Luton, UK, were arrested in September 2011 and later sentenced to prison.⁸⁴ And in October 2012, three individuals who were arrested for planning an attack considered welding butcher knives to a truck and driving into a crowd of civilians; that concept comes straight out of

⁷⁹The People of the State of New York against Jose Pimentel, Criminal Court of the City of New York, County of New York, November 20, 2011 http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2011/jose_pimentel_complaint.pdf

⁸⁰ “Naser Jason Abdo Charged Federally in Bomb Plot,” press release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, San Antonio Division, July 29, 2011, <http://www.fbi.gov/sanantonio/press-releases/2011/naser-jason-abdo-charged-federally-in-bomb-plot>.

⁸¹ “Naser Jason Abdo Sentenced to Life in Federal Prison in Connection with Killen Bomb Plot,” press release, Federal Bureau of Investigation, San Antonio Division, August 10, 2012, <http://www.fbi.gov/sanantonio/press-releases/2012/naser-jason-abdo-sentenced-to-life-in-federal-prison-in-connection-with-killen-bomb-plot>.

⁸² United States of America against Quazi Mohammad Rezwanul Ahsan Nafis, United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, October 17, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/10/18/nyregion/18fed-doc.html?ref=nyregion>.

⁸³ Judith Miller and David Samuels, “A Glossy Approach to Inciting Terrorism,” *Wall Street Journal*, November 27, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748703572404575635053157718986>; Lizette Alvarez, “Details Are Revealed in Brothers’ Terror Case,” *New York Times*, December 18, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/us/details-are-revealed-in-brothers-terror-case.html>; United States of America v. Adel Daoud, United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, September 15, 2012, http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/2045.pdf.

⁸⁴ David Mercer, “Four jailed for plot to bomb Territorial Army army base,” *The Independent*, April 18, 2013, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/four-jailed-for-plot-to-bomb-territorial-army-army-base-8578391.html>.

the second issue of *Inspire*, which includes an article on the “Ultimate Mowing Machine.”⁸⁵ Two years earlier, in December 2010, copies of issues of *Inspire* were found in the possession of nine people plotting to bomb Big Ben, the London Stock Exchange, and the US embassy in London, among other symbolic targets.⁸⁶ Russian security service chief Alexander Bortnikov expressed concern that a rash of forest fires in Europe in 2012 may have been inspired by an article in the ninth issue of *Inspire* magazine entitled, “It Is of Your Freedom to Ignite a Firebomb.”⁸⁷

Inspire has also come up in at least one terrorism case in Scotland. In its winter 2010 issue, *Inspire* praises Taimour Abdulwahhab al-Abdaly, who carried out a terrorist plot in Sweden. The issue describes Mr. Abdelwahab as a “hero” and tells readers that “living a comfortable life, and [being] married with children didn’t stop Taimour Abdulwahhab al-Abdaly from responding to the call of Jihad.”⁸⁸ Later, in an illustration meant to inspire individuals to engage in jihad themselves, the magazine depicts a choice between jihad and paradise on the one hand and helping non-believers and hell on the other. According to the illustration, Mr. Abdelwahab chose *jannah*, or paradise.⁸⁹ What will you, the reader, choose? Paradise, like Mr. Abdelwahab, or hell, the drawing asks? In the spring 2011 issue of *Inspire*, writers highlight that part of Mr. Abdelwahab’s success was “the fact [he was] able to pull off [his] operation without being halted by authorities.”⁹⁰ In *HME v Nassredine Menni*, the court found Mr. Menni guilty on multiple charges, including sending funds to Mr. Abdulwahhab.⁹¹

Nor is the magazine’s influence limited to practical advice enabling terrorist operations; much of the issues are devoted to theological and emotional justifications for violence. Recurring themes in issues of *Inspire* include glorifying “martyrs,” enumerating the sins and crimes of the West against Muslims, remonstrating against inaction, and emphasizing the potential impact of a single jihadist. Issue #8, in the fall of 2011, featured an article written by the late extremist preacher Anwar al-Awlaki, which argued that the deaths of women, children, and other non-combatants were not inescapably prohibited. “Women and children should not be singled out for killing . . . But in no way does it mean that Islam prohibits the fighting against the disbelievers if their men, women and children are intermingled. This understanding is very

⁸⁵ Paul Cheston, “Jihadists talked of building an Ultimate Mowing Machine,” *London Evening Standard*, October 23, 2012, <http://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/jihadists-talked-of-building-an-ultimate-mowing-machine-8222698.html>.

⁸⁶ Caroline Gammel, “Christmas bomb plot: nine men remanded over plan to ‘blow up Big Ben and Westminster Abbey,’” *The Telegraph*, December 27, 2010, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/8227193/Christmas-bomb-plot-nine-men-remanded-over-plan-to-blow-up-Big-Ben-and-Westminster-Abbey.html>.

⁸⁷ Jill Reilly, “Russia’s secret service says Al-Qaeda are behind spate of forest fires across Europe,” *Daily Mail*, October 5, 2012, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2213234/Russias-secret-service-says-Al-Qaeda-spate-forest-fires-Europe.html>.

⁸⁸ “News Flash,” *Inspire*, Winter 2010, p. 7

⁸⁹ “Roshonara & Taimour: Followers of the borderless loyalty,” *Inspire*, Winter 2010, p.25

⁹⁰ “Inspire Responses,” *Inspire*, Spring 2011, p 12

⁹¹ “Stockholm bomb funder Nasserddine Menni loses appeal,” *BBC*, December 6, 2013, <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-glasgow-west-25264906>.

dangerous and detrimental to jihad and awareness on this issue is very important. To stop the targeting of disbelievers who are at war with Muslims just because there are women and children among them leads to constraints on today's jihad that makes it very difficult, and at times, impossible to fight and places the Muslims at a great disadvantage compared to their enemy." Al-Awlaki even rules that anyone can be a target -- women, children, slaves, the elderly -- if they merely express an opinion in favor of the "war effort against Muslims."⁹² In general, *Inspire* calls for any and all violence that will result in the greatest toll on disbelievers, whether psychologically, economically, or through sheer human casualties. Throughout every issue, *Inspire* pulls quotes from the Qur'an and respected figures in Islam to back up its rhetoric.

Issue #1 of *Inspire* features the previously mentioned "Make a bomb in the kitchen of your Mom" article in a section labeled "Open Source Jihad." The purpose of this section is defined as "a resource manual for those who loathe the tyrants; includes bomb making techniques, security measures, guerrilla tactics, weapons training and all other jihad related activities." If that is not clear enough the editor adds an informal explanation: "A disaster for the repressive imperialistic nations: *The open source jihad is America's worst nightmare*" (Italics in the original). The article gives step-by-step instructions for the preparation of the bomb and includes pictures for each step. This inaugural issue also features an article by the former leader of al-Qaeda, the late Osama bin Laden, and the current leader of al-Qaeda, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Bin Laden argues that America is behind global warming, and that Americans "are the real terrorists, and drastic and decisive solutions are required to restrain and subdue them." Zawahiri, in a "Message to the People of Yemen," states that the CIA is really in control of Yemen and calls on Yemen to overthrow the "treasonous traitor" President Salih, who along with the House of Saud "sold their religion, honor and countries so Crusader America would be pleased with them."⁹³

In Issue #2 Shaykh Ibrahim al-Banna, AQAP's "media emir," writes that "Jihad is the peak of Islam and the operation that the mujahidin performed on the 11th of September represents a virtuous act." He continues to argue that President Obama is carrying out a crusade and the war against al Qaeda is actually a war on Islam. In another section labeled "The Jihad Times" using the same style as *The New York Times*, there is a handwritten article titled "Why not the West?" The article reassures aspiring jihadis from the West that they will be welcome, but the author states, "I strongly recommend all the brothers and sisters coming from the West to consider attacking the West in its own backyard. The effect is much greater, it always embarrasses the enemy, and these types of individual attacks are nearly impossible for them to contain." Anwar al-Awlaki has another article in which he deconstructs a declaration by a group of Islamic scholars which rejects a 14th century fatwa by Ibn Taymiyah, commonly cited by extremists as justification for their actions. The scholars declared that "anyone who seeks support from this fatwa for killing Muslims or non-Muslims has erred in his interpretation and has misapplied the

⁹² Anwar al-Awlaki, "Targeting the Populations of Countries That Are at War with the Muslims," *Inspire* 8 (2011): 41-42, <http://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/inspire-magazine-8.pdf>.

⁹³ *Inspire*, Summer 2010, Vol. 1, available at <http://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/06/aqap-inspire-magazine-volume-1-uncorrupted.pdf>.

revealed texts.”⁹⁴ To this Awlaki says, “the above statement is an ignominy.” This issue also includes the previously described “Ultimate Mowing Machine” article. In the “Open Jihad” section, several other “options for operations” are laid out, including the idea of using a pressurized cooker in a crowded area.

Issue #3 mainly focuses on what the magazine’s writers call “Operation Hemorrhage” in which they claim to have downed a UPS cargo plane flying out of Dubai in September 2010. Investigators were skeptical of these claims, noting there was no bomb.⁹⁵ Two other bombs were smuggled onto UPS and FedEx cargo planes to be delivered to synagogues in Chicago, “Obama’s city.” The names on each of the packages were medieval Crusades leaders. Although the bombs were intercepted before they reached the intended destinations, the head of foreign operations still claimed the operation was a success, writing that, “to be able to force the West to install stringent security measures sufficient enough to stop our explosive devices would add a heavy economic burden to an already faltering economy.”⁹⁶ Also included in the issue are pictures supposedly taken of the bomb hidden in a printer before the operation, and an explanation that “this operation is a response to the Crusaders’ aggression against the Muslims of Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, the Maghreb, Chechnya, and the Arabian Peninsula.”⁹⁷ Another article labeled “Technical Details” lays out how they smuggled a bomb through security.⁹⁸

In Issue #4 of *Inspire* there is an interview with Adil al-Abbab, AQAP’s top sharia official, which discusses the legitimacy of targeting non-Muslims and Yemeni soldiers.⁹⁹ According to his point of view, “So now when we look at the state of the Americans and Europeans, we see that they are in a state of war with us because of their participation in elections that choose governments that wage war against Muslims.” On this basis, “it is legitimate to target the people of the West.”¹⁰⁰ In another article entitled, “In order that they taste some of what we tasted,” Osama bin Laden discusses why he conducted the attacks on September 11th.¹⁰¹ In the “Open Source Jihad” section, featuring a picture of the US Capitol building, the main article is titled “Destroying Buildings.” Instructions on how to accomplish this task are laid out, including instructions on how to avoid suspicion while preparing for the task. The next article in the section gives detailed instructions on “Training with the AK,” a reference to an AK-47 or Kalashnikov.

⁹⁴ Talib Bin Mahfoudh, “Scholars issue New Declaration on Ibn Taymiyah’s fatwa,” *Saudi Gazette*, April 6, 2010, <http://www.saudigazette.com.sa/index.cfm?method=home.regcon&contentID=2010040568461>.

⁹⁵ “Al Qaeda Yemen wing claims parcel plot, UPS crash,” Reuters, November 5, 2010, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/05/us-usa-yemen-bomb-idUSTRE6A44PU20101105>.

⁹⁶ “The Objectives of Operation Hemorrhage,” *Inspire*, November 2010, Vol. 3, p 7. Available at <http://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/inspire-magazine-3.pdf>.

⁹⁷ Ibrahim Al-Banna, “Tawghit Exposed,” *Inspire*, November 2010, Vol. 3, p 10. Available at <http://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/inspire-magazine-3.pdf>.

⁹⁸ *Inspire*, Summer 2010, Vol. 3, available at <http://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/inspire-magazine-3.pdf>.

⁹⁹ Bill Roggio, “AQAP’s top sharia official killed in recent drone strike,” *Long War Journal*, October 20, 2012, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/10/aqaps_top_sharia_off.php.

¹⁰⁰ *Inspire*, November 2010, Vol. 4, Winter 2010, p 20. Available at <http://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2011/01/inspire-magazine-4.pdf>.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

Issue #5 continues the second part of “Training with the AK” in its “Open Source Jihad” section. In response to a reader-submitted question, another article details the importance of jihad in Yemen, saying, “Security is given to secularists, crusaders, disbelievers and atheists. War is waged against those who believe in the oneness of Allah.” There is also an interview with the military commander of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, in which he is asked to “tell us why the government of al-Saud (Saudi Arabia) is a legitimate target for the mujahidin?” In “The Jihadi Experiences,” the writer asserts that, “Terrorizing the enemies is a religious duty, and assassinating their leaders is a Prophetic tradition.” Much of the second half of the issue is devoted to the recent Arab Spring uprisings, including articles by al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and the late American Muslim radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki.

Issue #6 was the first to appear after the death of Osama bin Laden, and his image appears on the cover. The first article praises the nobility of bin Laden’s life and death in flowery language. Half a dozen other martyrs who were killed in battle or by US drones are eulogized in “*Shuhada*.” An ongoing series, “Why Did I Choose al-Qaeda?” cites the fact that al-Qaeda “take[s] into consideration the legitimate and universal ways in accomplishing victory,” i.e. violent jihad. “Open Source Jihad” concludes the three-part training on AK-47s, as well as instructing readers how to make acetone peroxide, an explosive. Publisher and editor Samir Khan writes a personal response to the death of bin Laden, whom he describes as a “lion,” a “light of hope,” and a “star in the heavens.” This is followed by a republished article by bin Laden (“An Address to the Revolutionaries”) and an al-Qaeda leader admonishing readers to choose between jihad or “disgrace.”

Issue #7 of *Inspire* is a special commemorative edition for the tenth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. An excerpt from the writings of Osama bin Laden, “Don’t let America become great in your eyes,” exhorts jihadists not to be intimidated by the United States’ military power. An American Muslim explains the media bias against *mujahidin*, and the superiority of al-Qaeda’s “media jihad.” Another article reflects on what “this heroic operation” achieved, followed by a series of photos of the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, as well as the bombings in Madrid and London; American casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq; armed Islamic militants; and stock pictures of weapons and potential targets, all accompanied by rousing quotes.

Issue #8 provides bios of three “martyrs” killed in the Arabian Peninsula, praising them for their piety and battlefield courage. A “History and Strategy” section lists the “priority arenas” for jihad, from the immediate neighborhood of Israel to Central Asia to the American homeland. An ex-Pakistani soldier recounts the moral corruption of the Pakistani army and its subservience to Britain and the “Crusaders.” The “Open Source Jihad” section, an *Inspire* regular, in this issue teaches readers the basics of using a handgun and remote control detonation. Anwar al-Awlaki explains how jihadi operations may acceptably result in the deaths of women, children, Muslims, and other innocents. Another recurring series, “Why Did I Choose al-Qaeda?” cites how the organization is the most hated by Christians and Jews, and fosters a strong sense of religious brotherhood.

Anwar al-Awlaki was killed in September 2011 by a US drone strike in Yemen, along with Samir Khan, an editor and publisher at *Inspire*. Issue #9 was the first to be published after their

deaths, and two of their personal friends write extended panegyric obituaries for the pair. The section entitled “Jihadi Experiences” lists the most important types of targets in the West -- e.g., political figures, infrastructure -- and this issue’s “Open Source Jihad” gives instructions for making firebombs and carrying out “urban assassinations.” Another article supports the burning of forests “in the land of the *Kuffar* enemies,” citing rulings from all of the Islamic schools of theology, followed by a condemnation of cowardliness from Abu Yahya al-Libi, a well-known and high-ranking al-Qaeda official. The chief editor also writes an op-ed in which he asserts that al-Qaeda is in fact more secure than America, which is suffering an economic recession and fighting an unwinnable war against an ideology.

Issue #10 publishes a submission from al-Qaeda’s current leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, railing against the “Zio-American [sic] crusade on Muslims and Islam.” A two-page ad displays the pictures of various Westerners “wanted dead or alive for crimes against Islam,” including several European cartoonists and journalists, Salman Rushdie, and the inflammatory American preacher Terry Jones, who is depicted with a gun firing into his head. The “Jihadi Experiences” section enumerates the benefits of “detering with terrorism.” Other writings include a letter from “the Blind Sheikh,” Omar Abd al-Rahim, a radical preacher imprisoned in North Carolina; an article by a woman urging other Muslim women to support the men in their jihad and to “push [their] loved ones to the battlefield”; an excerpted interview with American al-Qaeda member Adam Gadahn; a condemnation of inaction; and advice for torching parked vehicles and causing road accidents.

The majority of Issue #11 is devoted to laudatory coverage of the Boston Marathon bombings. It opens with a message to “the American nation” calling on Americans to stop supporting their “assaultive, oppressive and tyrannical” leaders, killing Muslim children, and “meddling” in Muslim nations. One article entitled “The Inevitable” discusses the effectiveness of “lone jihad,” using the Marathon bombings as a case study, while another stresses the religious obligation upon every individual to undertake jihad, regardless of the military balance of power (i.e. a single Muslim against American might).

On Mr. Tsarnaev’s computer authorities found a variety of data files, including several jihadi audio and video files produced by terrorist affiliated media outlets like al Tibyan Publications. These include lectures, articles, and videos -- including many audio and video clips of Islamic Nasheed chants promoting violent extremist ideology, a radical global narrative in which the West is at war with all Muslims and Muslims must fight back, and glorifying violence and terrorism. It is especially telling that some of these radical audio clips were downloaded to mobile devices for inspiration-on-the-go, as it were.

The files in question include the following:

- Rasool Allah Inspiring Words Of Truth! - YouTube.flv: This nasheed presents ancient Islamic history as immediately relevant to Muslims today, in particular the history of Muslim battles. Applying those lessons to today, the speaker invokes the need to fight “the United Snakes of America.” The speaker warns that all Muslims will be held accountable on the Day of Judgment when they will be judged on their commitment to battling for Islam. The speaker states: “I am the one who will wipe out the Kufar

[unbeliever, or infidel] from this earth.” This, the speaker insists, is the responsibility of all Muslims.

- Rasool Allah The Prophet Of Mercy And War! - YouTube.flv: This nasheed quotes the prophet Muhammad as saying, “I am the prophet of Jihad” and “I am the prophet of massacre.” Muslims must engage in jihad to establish the Caliphate, the speaker intones, adding that Mohammad made himself clear: “I have come to slaughter” (while this is said one hears in the background the sound of swords clashing). It is the responsibility of Muslims to make Islam dominant, the speaker says.
- Commander Khattab - YouTube.flv: This is a video tribute to Omar Ibn al-Khattab featuring a photograph slide-show of “Commander Khattab.” The nasheed features a singer calling for Muslims to fight and protect their land. It calls for Muslims to fight, resist Zionism, infidels, etc.
- Aseer nasheed - YouTube.flv: This video nasheed shows captive Muslims behind barbed wire and talks about how the singer’s heart is aching and his gaze is broken. “I am not able to sleep because in my heart are the wounds of the captives and it makes me restless as if I am the captive.” The singer talks of his humiliation, shown against pictures of captured militants being watched by Western soldiers (presumably in Iraq or Afghanistan), “as I see our heroes being chained by the worthless (disbelievers)” -- shown against prisoners in orange jumpsuits, presumably in Guantanamo. The nasheed continues: “I am imprisoned O my Lord, without any guilt (except determination) motivated by the call of jihad.” The last phrase -- “motivated by the call of jihad” -- is sung while a picture is shown of convicted terrorist Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman. Abdul Rahman was convicted in federal court in 1995 for conspiring to carry out a terrorist campaign of bombings and assassinations intended to destroy the United Nations and New York landmarks, kill hundreds of people, and force America to abandon its support for Israel and Egypt. More pictures of incarcerated Muslims are shown. Later a grieving American soldier is shown. “O Allah (swt) tighten the dunya [temporal world] upon them and torture them (desbelievers) with it for you are Al-Qadeer (able to do all things).”
- Islamic Nasheed -- When will the muslim ummah unite -- YouTube.flv: This is a rhythmic nasheed on how the Muslim world broke its deal with Allah, so Allah sent a messenger -- troops of the devil, the kufar (infidel), Islam-haters. Foreign militaries came and invaded the Muslim world, bringing secular ideologies, tribalism, and nationalism. “We abandoned our religion, and so Allah abandoned us.” The message is that Jinah (paradise) must be earned and that is done by investing in the re-establishment of the Caliphate. Troops of the devil colonized the Muslims, they hated Islam. Nationalism and ethnicity needs to be put aside in favor of Islamic unity. Success as an Ummah (Islamic nation) lies in following the life of the prophet and following the Koran. “The time is for

Jihad, and Salam (peace) to the believers who participate.” It continues: “We are here to establish Islam on this earth. So by the will of Allah let’s give Islam a rebirth.”

- The man who went jannah without praying....mp3: This lecture offers the story of a man who had not been a practicing Muslim but was able to gain entry to paradise because he died as a martyr (shaheed) fighting for the sake of Islam, not his own honor. The idea is that martyrdom for the sake of Islam forgives all and is even more powerful than prayer -- it is the one deed that guarantees a person the highest levels of paradise even if they did none of the other things required of a Muslim under Islamic doctrine.
- The most amazing nasheed....mp3: This is a spiritual nasheed that assures that Allah promises the believers that their portion is protected. It praises the person who acts as a good, practicing Muslim, praises Allah, prays, etc. “Be mindful of Allah; Allah will be mindful of you.... Get to know Allah in moments of need; Allah will know you in moments of difficulty.”
- THE MOST WONDERFUL NASHEED!....mp3: This nasheed calls on Muslims not to waste a single moment of their lives. While the kufar (infidel) sees life as a fight against nature, Muslims believe their lives are predestined and therefore their lives are pre-ordained. Muslims must always hold themselves accountable before God.

V. Mr. Tsarnaev’s “Note in the Boat”

The note Mr. Tsarnaev wrote while hiding from police in a boat echoes some of the fundamental messages that appear prominently in the radicalization materials in question. Right off the bat, Mr. Tsarnaev writes he is jealous of his dead brother, who received “the reward of jannatul firdus” (the highest level of heaven) before he – Dzhokhar -- could achieve the same. “I ask Allah to make me a shahied [martyr] to allow me to return to him and be among all the righteous people in the highest levels of heaven. He who Allah guides no one can misguide.” The principles of martyrdom, earning a spot in the highest levels of heaven by dying as a martyr and fighting for Islam, and insisting that he does not mourn his brother are all common and fundamental parts of the radical Islamist narrative prevalent in these materials.

Mr. Tsarnaev continues, bearing witness that there is no God but Allah and Mohammad is his messenger -- the testimony, or Shehadah, declaring one’s faith in Islam. According to investigators, on January 1, 2013, a photograph of Mr. Tsarnaev sitting with a flag declaring the Shehadah on display behind him was taken and later backed up on his Vaio computer.

The letter continues: “The U.S. government is killing our innocent civilians.” Note the use of the term “our” -- he appears to subscribe to the radical global narrative in which the West is at war with the Muslim Ummah (nation), and a Muslim’s identity is tied solely to his religious affiliation and not his ethnicity, nationality, or citizenship.

Echoing the language used by radicalizers like Awlaki and others, he writes: “As a M[bullet hole, presumably the word should read Muslim], I can’t stand to see such evil go

unpunished; we Muslims are only one body, you hurt one you hurt us all.” He explains that it is up to him to “punish” America for this “evil.”

The echo of the radical worldview present in the materials in question continues, as Mr. Tsarnaev writes: “The Ummah is beginning to rise/awa[bullet hole, presumably the word should read awaken], has awakened the mujahideen [jihad fighters], know you are fighting men who look into the barrel of your gun and see heaven, now how can you compete with that.”

He concludes: “We are promised victory and we will surely get it. Now I don’t like killing innocent people, it is forbidden in Islam, but due to said [bullet hole] it is allowed. All credit goes [bullet hole].” And there is the crux of the matter: under the violent extremist worldview of radical Islamist thought espoused by Awlaki and others, the murder of “innocent people,” which under other circumstances would be prohibited, is now not only “allowed,” but indeed is the ticket to the highest paradise. Looking down the barrel of a gun, those who fight for Islam see heaven, according to this radical narrative.

Mr. Tsarnaev’s note not only echoes the extremist narrative present in much of the material authorities found among his belongings, but excerpts from the note now appear in an English language magazine produced by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Published in August 2014 and intended to copy the style of the group’s earlier *Inspire* magazine series, the al-Malahem Media English Publication lists a timeline of jihadi attacks going back to 1980 and leading up to, and including, the Boston Marathon attack. The magazine describes the attack as perpetrated by “two lone mujahideen” who were inspired by *Inspire* magazine and lists the perpetrators’ motive as “American’s interference in Muslim countries.” The magazine offers nine pages of instruction on how construct a pressure cooker bomb, highlighting “The Boston Brothers,” who, the article informs, used this device to attack the Boston Marathon. Under pictures of the Tsarnaev brothers, a caption reads: “The Pressure Cooker Bomb was successfully used by the Boston Brothers during the 2013 Boston Marathon.” Quoting from Mr. Tsarnaev’s note, the al-Qaeda magazine continues: “Dzokhar Tsarnaev (may Allah hasten his release) wrote regarding the motive for the Boston operation: ‘The U.S. Government is killing our innocent civilians, I can’t stand to see such evil go unpunished, we Muslims are one body, you hurt one you hurt us all’.”¹⁰²

The impact of the Boston Marathon bombings cannot be overstated. Beyond the obvious pain and suffering caused to the victims of the bombing and their families, the bombing has been claimed by the global jihadi community as one of its own, carried out by “mujahideen” inspired by jihadist online materials, and now used to inspire new prospective homegrown violent extremists to follow suit and do the same. The Boston Marathon bombing was a classic case of global terrorism: an attack on civilians, at a time and place intended to kill and injure as many people as possible and to frighten – terrorize -- a great many more. The Boston Marathon bombings are a painful example of an attack that succeeded not only in terms of the death and

¹⁰² “Palestine: betrayal of the guilty conscience,” Al-Malahem Media English Production, <http://jihadology.net/2014/08/16/al-mala%E1%B8%A5im-media-presents-a-new-release-from-al-qaidah-in-the-arabian-peninsula-palestine-betrayal-of-the-guilty-conscience/>

destruction in caused, but also in terms of accomplishing and furthering the goals and objectives of al Qaeda and the global jihadi movement. The bombing demonstrated radical Islamist terrorists' continued global reach, and their ability to strike at the heart of the American homeland despite the massive investment of funds, resources and personnel in homeland security since 9/11. It provides jihadists a tangible example of Muslims who, from their standpoint, traded their own future and comfort in the West for an opportunity to fight for their religion, defend their co-religionists, and forswear comfort and opportunity in this lifetime for martyrdom and the highest levels of paradise in the afterlife. In other words, the Boston Marathon bombing underscored for jihadists the "truth" of their radical worldview -- the bombers subscribed to their global narrative, therefore it must be true --and set the stage for the future radicalization of potential recruits.

Dr. Matthew Levitt

September 2, 2014